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STRUCK BY STEREOTYPE:
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It was always recognition that one thing that conspicuously
distinguishes women from men is that only women become
pregnant; and if you subject a woman to disadvantageous treatment
on the basis of her pregnant status, which was what was happening
to Captain Struck, you would be denying her equal treatment under
1
the law.

INTRODUCTION
This is an attempt at recovery. This Essay hopes to call attention
2
to then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 1972 merits brief in Struck
3
v. Secretary of Defense. The brief has been underappreciated in part
because the Supreme Court of the United States eventually declined
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1. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 206 (1993) (statement
of Judge Ginsburg) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearings].
2. See Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178),
1972 WL 135840. Melvin Wulf, Joel Gora, Brenda Feigen Fasteau, and Robert Czeisler also
signed the brief. Melvin Wulf was the Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU). Joel Gora was an ACLU attorney who worked on the case. Brenda Feigen (no longer
Fasteau) was a cofounder of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project. Robert Czeisler was the
attorney, affiliated with the ACLU in the state of Washington, who represented Captain Struck
in the district court and the Ninth Circuit. His valiant lawyering kept Captain Struck in the Air
Force and fighting to remain there, not discharged, as the government would have preferred. It
is evident that Ginsburg’s distinctive voice pervades the brief.
3. Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
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to decide the case. But anyone seeking to understand the origins and
nature of Justice Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination would be
well advised to read this brief. So would anyone interested in
reimagining the bounds of constitutional possibility in the realm of
gender equality.
In her capacity as general counsel for the Women’s Rights
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, Ginsburg filed the
Struck brief a little more than a year after the Court decided Reed v.
5
Reed, but before the Court began to give shape to liberty and
equality doctrine concerning the regulation of pregnant women in
6
7
cases such as Roe v. Wade, Frontiero v. Richardson, and Geduldig v.
8
Aiello. Ginsburg wrote the brief on behalf of an Air Force officer,
Captain Susan Struck, whose pregnancy—and whose refusal on

4. See id. at 1071 (vacating and remanding for consideration of mootness in light of the
government’s change in position).
5. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause
an Idaho law that gave automatic preference to men over women as administrators of estates.
Id. at 77. Reed was handed down on November 22, 1971. The Struck brief was filed on
December 4, 1972.
6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court decided Roe on January 22, 1973, less
than two months after Ginsburg filed the Struck brief.
7. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Frontiero invalidated under the Equal
Protection Clause a federal statute providing that spouses of male members of the military are
dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental
benefits, but that spouses of female members are not dependents unless they are in fact
dependent for more than one-half of their support. Id. at 692 (plurality opinion).
8. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig upheld against an equal protection
challenge a California law that provided workers comprehensive disability insurance for all
temporarily disabling conditions that might prevent them from working, except pregnancy, on
the ground that pregnancy discrimination was not necessarily sex discrimination. Id. at 496–97.
Although laws burdening pregnant employees harm only female employees, the Court stressed
that they potentially benefit a group that includes employees of both sexes. See id. at 497 n.20
(“The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance
program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential
recipients into two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits
of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.”). The Court subsequently tried to apply
Geduldig’s reasoning to federal employment discrimination law in General Electric Corp. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Gilbert held that a disability benefit plan excluding disabilities
related to pregnancy was not sex-based discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e to e-17 (2006). Id. at 145–46. Congress responded by
enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII (PDA), which defines
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex. See Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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9

religious grounds to have an abortion —subjected her to automatic
10
discharge from military service.
The brief demonstrates that, from the very beginning, Justice
Ginsburg has conceived discrimination against pregnant women as a
core case of sex discrimination. In 1972, Ginsburg understood
pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination because she has long
viewed laws enforcing sex roles of the separate spheres tradition as
11
compromising the “equal citizenship stature” of women.
In Struck, Ginsburg argued that excluding a pregnant woman
from the Air Force when men otherwise similarly situated in their
capacity or incapacity to work are provided sick leave is a core case of
sex discrimination because the distinction “reflects arbitrary notions
of woman’s place wholly at odds with contemporary legislative and
judicial recognition that individual potential must not be restrained,
nor equal opportunity limited, by law-sanctioned stereotypical
12
prejudgments.” The brief opened by emphasizing that laws imposing
traditional sex roles on pregnant women deny individuals equal
opportunity and perpetuate the secondary social status of women:
Heading the list of arbitrary barriers that have plagued women
seeking equal opportunity is disadvantaged treatment based on their
unique childbearing function. Until very recent years, jurists have
regarded any discrimination in the treatment of pregnant women
and mothers as “benignly in their favor.” But in fact, restrictive
rules, and particularly discharge for pregnancy rules, operate as
“built-in headwinds” that drastically curtail women’s opportunities.
Decisions of this Court that span a century have contributed to this
anomaly: presumably well-meaning exaltation of woman’s unique

9. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 10–11.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Justice Ginsburg has used this or similar language in a variety of settings, both on and
off the Court. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to
vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”); United States v.
Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly recognized that neither
federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or
official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature—equal
opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual
talents and capacities.”). See generally Neil S. Siegel, Equal Citizenship Stature: Justice
Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision in President Obama’s America, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV.
(forthcoming December 2009) (participating in a symposium honoring the jurisprudence of
Justice Ginsburg).
12. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 7.
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role in bearing children has, in effect, restrained women from
developing their individual talents and capacities and has impelled
13
them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society.

Ginsburg thus argued that traditions of regulating women during
pregnancy are not in fact benign but instead play a key role in
imposing on women “subordinate” social status.
As this Essay shows, Ginsburg’s equal protection argument in
Struck anticipates views that she would subsequently express on the
14
bench —including her account of intermediate scrutiny for the Court
15
in United States v. Virginia, which requires the judiciary closely to
examine laws that classify on the basis of sex but allows government
to differentiate between men and women so long as “such
classifications [are] not . . . used, as they once were, to create or
16
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”
The Struck brief illustrates beautifully how Ginsburg reasons from
antisubordination values in defining constitutional equality, in
identifying the perspective from which to determine whether equality
values are implicated, and in linking equality- and liberty-based
arguments for the full participation of women in the public and
private life of the nation.
Ginsburg’s understanding of pregnancy discrimination in Struck
calls into question certain feminist characterizations of her as a

13. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp.
8, 19 (D. Conn. 1968); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
14. For one account of Ginsburg’s legal strategy, see Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of
Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the Law, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 73 (1989). For
examples of other feminist lawyers of the era who challenged pregnancy discrimination as sex
discrimination, see Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1385–86 (2006).
“In constitutional and Title VII litigation in the early 1970s, feminist lawyers including Ruth
Ginsburg, Wendy Williams, and Susan Deller Ross . . . argu[ed] that regulations pertaining to
pregnant women were sex-based, subject to heightened scrutiny, and wrongful when they
enforced stereotypical understandings of women’s roles.” Id. Wendy Williams wrote the
petitioner’s brief in Geduldig, and Susan Deller Ross was pivotal “in providing arguments to the
EEOC that the Equal Protection Clause reached pregnancy discrimination.” Id. at 1385 n.169.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Susan Deller Ross coauthored a 1977 op-ed responding to Geduldig.
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Susan Deller Ross, Pregnancy and Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1977, at A33 (“The Supreme Court decision was a stunning rejection of the position that
had been taken by the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and six Federal
courts of appeals. These authorities had identified discrimination against the pregnant worker as
the essence of sex discrimination.”).
15. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
16. Id. at 534 (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)).
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proponent of formal equality—a criticism that has been advanced by
those who viewed Ginsburg’s repeated representation of male
plaintiffs in the early sex discrimination cases as narrowly reflecting a
17
concern with arbitrary sex-based classification only. Ginsburg
argued that laws differentiating on the basis of sex are
unconstitutional when they enforce traditional sex stereotypes
because such laws wrongfully restrict individual opportunity and
contribute to the subordinate status of women. Ginsburg was able to
perceive social subordination in the exclusion of a pregnant woman
from military service, even though pregnancy had long been
understood as the principal physical difference between the sexes,
because she saw that government regulation was enforcing traditional
18
sex stereotypes. Ginsburg saw clearly.
As interesting and consequential as Ginsburg’s own views have
been, recovery of the Struck brief is even more important for what it
illuminates about the present. In the immediate aftermath of Struck,
the Court acknowledged that pregnancy discrimination might be an
invidious expression of sex discrimination but did not seriously
consider the account that Ginsburg and other feminist litigators
offered of how laws discriminating against pregnant women could
enforce traditional sex stereotypes and so deny women the equal
19
protection of the laws. Nor did the Court scrutinize the relationship
to which the Struck brief pointed—between cases protecting women’s
right to equal protection and protecting their autonomy in deciding
20
whether to bear children. Decades later, however, through a series
21
of incremental changes that have not yet been fully recognized, the
Court has begun to reason from something like Ginsburg’s position
17. See, e.g., Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Limits of
Formal Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 216, 231
(Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); see also infra note 84 and accompanying text. See infra Part III for a
discussion of substantive (that is, antisubordination) versus formal (that is, anticlassification)
views of equality.
18. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 8–9.
19. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974) (“Absent a showing that
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or
exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as
with respect to any other physical condition.”). On feminist arguments of the era, see supra note
14.
20. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 10.
21. See infra Part IV (discussing changes manifest in decades of PDA litigation, Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
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without quite embracing it. The final chapter in this domain of
constitutional law has yet to be written.
Part I recounts the facts of Struck. Part II details the arguments
Ginsburg made in her merits brief in the case. Part III explores what
Struck suggests about Ginsburg’s views on constitutional equality.
Part IV shows that although the Court did not initially embrace the
understanding of pregnancy discrimination that Ginsburg expressed
in Struck, over time the Court has begun to internalize the feminist
movement’s concerns about the stereotyping pregnant women face,
incorporating these concerns into equal protection and due process
doctrines regarding the regulation of pregnant women.
I. THE FACTS OF STRUCK
22

The facts of Struck v. Secretary of Defense were straightforward.
Captain Susan Struck was a career officer in the United States Air
23
Force who served as a nurse in the Vietnam War. In 1970, she
24
became pregnant. She was ordered to an Air Force base in the state
25
of Washington, where a disposition board hearing was held. She
declared her intent to give the child up for adoption as soon as she
gave birth, and she stated that her accrued leave time of sixty days
was more than sufficient to cover the temporary period of disability
26
that she anticipated at the time of childbirth. The Air Force,
however, pursuant to a regulation then in effect, gave her this choice:
27
have an abortion on the base or leave the Service. Because Captain
22. This Essay takes the facts from the Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 3–7. Justice
Ginsburg has recounted the story of Struck on more than one occasion. See Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remarks for the Celebration of 75 Years of Women’s Enrollment at Columbia Law
School, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (2002); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial
Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1200–02 (1992) (Madison Lecture delivered in March 1993);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Advocating the Elimination
of Gender-Based Discrimination: The 1970s New Look at the Equality Principle, Address at the
University of Cape Town, South Africa (Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Advocating],
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-10-06.html. She also
discussed Struck at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing. See, e.g., Ginsburg Hearings, supra
note 1, at 205–06; see also infra Part II.
23. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3–4.
26. Id. at 4.
27. See id. The regulation stated:
The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the least practical
delay when it is determined that one of the conditions in a or b below exist . . .
a. Pregnancy:
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Struck was a practicing Roman Catholic, abortion was not an option
28
for her. But neither did she quietly accept the termination of her
29
chosen career. She instead sued to fend off the discharge, securing
able representation from lawyers for the American Civil Liberties
Union in Washington.
Captain Struck was able to obtain a stay of her discharge each
month, but she lost on the merits both in the district court and in the
30
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In the view of
those courts, it was constitutionally irrelevant that no other physical
condition occasioning a temporary period of disability—whether a
broken leg or drug and alcohol abuse (which might not be
temporary)—resulted in mandatory discharge regardless of individual
31
circumstances. Nor did it matter that a male officer who participated
in conceiving a child was free—indeed, encouraged—to continue his
32
service career as a parent.
The Supreme Court agreed to entertain Captain Struck’s claims
to constitutional attention. Ginsburg scored the Air Force regulation
at bar as a violation of (1) equal protection, (2) Captain Struck’s right
to privacy in the conduct of her personal life, and (3) her free exercise
33
of religion. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold was apparently

(1) General:
(a) A woman will be discharged from the service with the least practical delay when a
determination is made by a medical officer that she is pregnant.
...
b. Minor Children:
(1) General. The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the least
practical delay when it is established that she:
...
(d) Has given birth to a living child while in a commissioned officer status.
Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Air Force Regulation 3612). A 1971 amendment to the regulation provided that “Discharge Action will be cancelled if
Pregnancy is Terminated.” Id. at 1376 (quoting Part I.C of 1971 Amendments to Regulations).
28. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 56.
29. See id. at 4.
30. Struck, 460 F.2d at 1374, 1377.
31. “[Captain] Struck’s problem,” Ginsburg fought the temptation to state in opening the
brief, was that she “picked the wrong form of recreation in Vietnam.” See Markowitz, supra
note 14, at 81 n.100 (quoting oral statement by Ginsburg). Ginsburg held her tongue, id. at 81,
presumably because she was concerned about turning off the audience.
32. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 55 (“[P]arenthood among servicemen
is not deterred, indeed additional benefits are provided to encourage men who become fathers
to remain in service.” (citations omitted)).
33. See infra Part II.
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concerned about the government’s chances before the Court. “He
recommended that the Air Force waive Captain Struck’s discharge
and abandon its policy of automatically discharging women for
34
pregnancy.” The Air Force agreed, and General Griswold moved to
35
dismiss the case as moot.
The Supreme Court never heard oral argument. It elected to
vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit “to
consider the issue of mootness in light of the position presently
36
asserted by the Government.”
II. GINSBURG’S ARGUMENTS IN STRUCK
37

Ginsburg’s Struck brief has been neglected not only because the
Court did not decide the merits of the case, but also because, shortly
thereafter, the Justices rejected an equal protection challenge to a
38
pregnancy discrimination claim. This neglect is unfortunate. Among
its other virtues, the Struck brief clarifies Justice Ginsburg’s approach
to sex discrimination. Recalling Captain Susan Struck’s story during
her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, then-Judge Ginsburg
sought “to explain how [her] own thinking developed on [the] issue”
of sex discrimination, and she identified “a case involving a woman’s
39
choice for birth rather than the termination of her pregnancy.” “The

34. Ginsburg, Advocating, supra note 22. The authors have not been able to determine
why Griswold feared a Supreme Court decision on the merits in Struck. They strongly suspect,
however, that he perceived governmental coercion of abortion as an inadvisable context in
which to vindicate the federal government’s asserted interests in the area of pregnancy
discrimination. The context of Struck was very much one of coercion. See, e.g., Janice Goodman,
Rhonda Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe, Where Do We Go from Here?, 1
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 20, 35 (1974) (discussing Struck as a case arising “[i]n the area of
coercion”).
35. Memorandum Suggesting Mootness, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No.
72-178). For Ginsburg’s response to the motion, see Opposition to Memorandum for the
Respondents Suggesting Mootness, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72-178).
36. Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071.
37. Reva B. Siegel, Comments, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL OPINION 244,
245 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). For another account of Struck, see Siegel, supra note 14, at 1385
& n.169.
38. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause permitted California to exclude from its disability insurance program the risk of
disability resulting from normal pregnancy).
39. Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 1, at 205.
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Struck brief,” she recalled, “marks the time when I first thought long
40
and hard about this question.”
In the brief, Ginsburg argued that government regulation of
pregnant women was presumptively unconstitutional when such
regulation enforced the sex roles and stereotypes of the separate
spheres tradition—the dyadic structuring of sex roles in which men
are expected to perform as breadwinners and women are expected to
perform as economically dependent caregivers. Ginsburg portrayed
the plaintiff’s discharge for pregnancy as perpetuating this tradition:
The central question raised in this case is whether the Air Force,
consistent with the equal protection principle inherent in the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, may call for immediate
discharge of pregnant women officers (whether detection of
pregnancy occurs at 8 days or 8 months), unless pregnancy
terminates soon after detection, while granting sick leave for all
other physical conditions occasioning a period of temporary
disability. It is petitioner’s position that this distinction reflects
arbitrary notions of woman’s place wholly at odds with contemporary
legislative and judicial recognition that individual potential must not
be restrained, nor equal opportunity limited, by law-sanctioned
stereotypical prejudgments. Captain Struck seeks no favors or special
protection. She simply asks to be judged on the basis of her
individual capacities and qualifications, and not on the basis of
41
characteristics assumed to typify pregnant women.

As Ginsburg presented it, the government’s discrimination
against pregnant officers was a paradigmatic case of the sex-role
restrictions that subordinated women. Because it viewed pregnant
officers through traditional sex stereotypes, the government excluded
all pregnant women from employment, rather than tying eligibility to
42
serve to capacity to work. The very case at bar illustrated that “many
women are capable of working effectively during pregnancy and
require only a brief period of absence immediately before and after
43
childbirth.” But the government did not make such an individualized
determination. Instead, it barred all pregnant women from serving,
44
putatively to protect them. Regulations that purport to protect

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 206.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 14 (emphasis added).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 20.
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pregnant women by forcing them to stop working, the Struck brief
sharply observed, “have in practice deprived working women of the
protection they most need: protection of their right to work to
45
support themselves and, in many cases, their families as well.” Thus,
“mandatory pregnancy discharge reinforces societal pressure to
46
relinquish career aspirations for a hearth-centered existence.”
The sex role stereotyping that the Air Force regulation enforced
was perhaps most visible in its sex-differentiated approach to
parenting. The regulation had defined the terms of service in such a
way as to force a choice between employment and parenthood—for
47
women only. Fathers were allowed to serve in the Air Force while
mothers were not: Although “men in the Air Force are not
constrained to avoid the pleasures and responsibilities of procreation
48
and parenthood,” Captain Struck “was presumed unfit for service
under a regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits
into the stereotyped vision . . . of the ‘correct’ female response to
49
pregnancy.”
The pregnancy regulation challenged in Struck assessed pregnant
women’s employment qualifications as a group rather than as
individuals, and it prohibited the employment of officers who became
mothers, while allowing the employment of officers who became
fathers. The regulation’s prescriptive assumptions about pregnant
women reflected and reinforced the sex roles of the separate spheres
50
tradition, defining women’s family role in such a way as to make

45. Id. at 36. Ginsburg also observed that mandatory discharge puts a pregnant woman at a
competitive disadvantage with men, “for it deprives her of opportunity for training and work
experience during pregnancy and, in many cases, for a prolonged period thereafter.” Id.
46. Id. at 37; see also id. (“Loss of her job and accumulated benefits profoundly affect the
choices open to her. No position awaits her after childbirth and she is apt to encounter
discrimination in locating new employment, this time because she is a mother. If she defers
return to the labor force for an extended period, her skills will have grown rusty and, upon
attempted re-entry, she will face a further barrier: this time her age as well as her sex and
limited work experience will count against her.” (footnote omitted)).
47. Id. at 55.
48. Id. at 48.
49. Id. at 50–51 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 52 (“The
discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited
notion that a woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home
to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care.” (footnote omitted)).
50. See supra text accompanying note 49; cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 50–51
(“[T]he regulation arbitrarily establishes a presumption of unfitness, distinguishing irrationally
between pregnancy and far more debilitating physical conditions that do not occasion automatic
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women dependents and second-class participants in core activities
associated with citizenship. “[P]resumably well-meaning exaltation of
woman’s unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied women
equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities
and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in
51
society.” Increasingly, Americans were recognizing that laws
imposing this traditional role on women violate women’s right to the
52
equal protection of the laws. “In very recent years,” Ginsburg
explained, “a new appreciation of women’s place has been generated
in the United States. Activated by feminists of both sexes, legislatures
and courts have begun to recognize and respond to the subordinate
position of women in our society and the second-class status our
53
institutions historically have imposed upon them.”
Although focusing most heavily on the equal protection
argument, Ginsburg lodged two additional constitutional objections
to the Air Force regulation. First, she urged that the regulation
54
violated Captain Struck’s right to privacy. Relying on Griswold v.
55
56
Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird, she argued that the regulation
“substantially infringes upon her right to sexual privacy, and her
57
autonomy in deciding ‘whether to bear . . . a child.’” In response to
the Air Force’s suggestion that it was aiming to encourage
reproduction control, Ginsburg noted that the Air Force provided
additional benefits to service members who become fathers in order

discharge, and differentiating capriciously between a female and male who surrenders a child
for adoption.”).
51. Id. at 38; see also id. at 38–45 (discussing, inter alia, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); and Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)). A similar sentence appears in her brief in Frontiero. See
Brief of ACLU as Amicus Curiae at 34–35, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No.
71-1694) (“[P]resumably well-meaning exaltation of woman’s unique role as wife and mother
has, in effect, denied women equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities
and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society.”). Ginsburg
“[w]orked on Frontiero and Struck simultaneously.” Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc.
Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Neil S. Siegel (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file with authors).
52. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30–32.
53. Id. at 26–27 (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 52 (“Imposition of this outmoded standard upon petitioner unconstitutionally
encroaches upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life.”).
55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
57. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 54 (quoting Baird, 405 U.S. at 453).
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58

to encourage them to continue serving. “The woman,” by stark
contrast, “serves subject to ‘regulation’; her pursuit of an Air Force
59
career requires that she decide not to bear a child.”
Ginsburg also asserted a free exercise claim, “stress[ing] that the
challenged regulation operates with particularly brutal force against
60
women of [Captain Struck’s Roman Catholic] faith.” This was
because “[t]ermination of pregnancy prior to the birth of a living child
61
was not an option [she] could choose.” In sum, “the regulation pitted
62
her Air Force career against . . . her religious conscience.”
III. THE LIGHT SHED BY STRUCK
What does Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s merits brief in Struck suggest
about her understanding of constitutional equality? Her clear-sighted
insistence in the brief that “disadvantageous treatment because of
63
pregnancy is indeed sex discrimination” indicates that, from the
beginning, she had recognized that regulation of pregnancy could be
discriminatory. She views some, but not all, regulation of pregnancy
as discriminatory, just as she opposes most, but not all, forms of
gender differentiation by the government as a violation of equal
protection. Ginsburg neither mechanically rejects the potential
relevance of differences between the sexes nor invariably embraces
them. She is deeply concerned with disadvantageous disparate
treatment, yet she contests the government’s efforts to impose sex-

58. Id. at 55 (“[P]arenthood among servicemen is not deterred, indeed additional benefits
are provided to encourage men who become fathers to remain in service.”).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 56.
61. Id.
62. Id. (footnote omitted). In the final section of the brief, Ginsburg demonstrated myriad
problems with the government’s proffered rationales for the regulation: administrative
convenience, contraception encouragement, hazards of the combat zone, and readiness and
effectiveness of the fighting force. For example, she argued that administrative convenience was
rejected in Reed as flatly insufficient to exclude women from opportunities, and that servicemen
were in no way encouraged to use contraceptives. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 62–
65. She further noted that pregnancy triggered termination regardless of whether it occurred in
a combat zone, and she suggested that the regulation would increase the potential hazards of the
combat zone by making it less likely that women would quickly reveal pregnancies within a
combat zone. Id. at 65–66 (citing Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Colo. 1972)).
Finally, she noted that substantially more serious and lasting disabilities, such as drug addiction
and alcoholism, did not trigger automatic discharge regardless of where they occurred. See id. at
66–69. The rationale left standing was “blatant prejudice against women for a condition peculiar
to their sex.” Id. at 69.
63. Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 1, at 206.
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role restrictions primarily because she apprehends the harms that a
particular, historically entrenched system of social roles has inflicted
on both sexes—especially women. At bottom, the Struck brief
suggests, Ginsburg contests legally enforced sex-role differentiation
because she views the prevailing system of sex-role differentiation as
64
perpetuating the subordinate status of women. Heading the list of
arbitrary barriers that have plagued women seeking equal
opportunity,” she thus insisted, “is disadvantaged treatment based on
65
their unique childbearing function.” The harm is not simply the
restriction imposed on one woman’s opportunities, but the
“disadvantaged treatment” regularly inflicted on women because of
their childbearing capacity. Ginsburg was concerned with a practice
harming a group.
In Struck, Ginsburg highlighted the forms of group disadvantage
that discrimination can impose, and she repeatedly related concerns
about stereotyping and subordination. For example, Ginsburg
emphasized that laws enforcing traditional sex stereotypes inflict
harm because they reinforce “the subordinate position of women in
our society and the second-class status our institutions historically
66
have imposed upon them.” The Struck brief challenged the
government’s discriminatory discharge primarily because the
government was enforcing sex roles that reinforced the inferior social
67
status of a historically marginalized group. This antisubordination
perspective would shape Ginsburg’s approach to equal protection on
64. A wide range of scholars have discussed the antisubordination understanding of equal
protection. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 38 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 151 (1976); Athena D. Mutua, The
Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2006) (“Critical Race Theory’s . . . stance is one of
‘antisubordination.’”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–76 (2004); see also
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (arguing “that the scope of the
[antisubordination and aniticlassification] principles overlap, [and] that their application shifts
over time in response to social contestation and social struggle”); Jill Elaine Hasday, The
Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public
Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 769–79 (2002) (discussing different accounts of the
antisubordination principle).
65. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 34.
66. Id. at 27; see also text accompanying notes 13, 51.
67. See Siegel, supra note 64, at 1472–73 (defining “the antisubordination principle” as “the
conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social
status of historically oppressed groups”).
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the Court as well. For example, in her majority opinion in United
States v. Virginia, she would distinguish sharply between efforts to
exclude women from institutions or opportunities in American
society, and efforts to include them by taking relevant differences
68
(such as pregnancy) into account.
More specifically, the Struck brief exemplifies that
antisubordination values (1) define Ginsburg’s understanding of what
constitutional equality is, and thus guide her determination of when
and how equality values are implicated; (2) identify the perspective
from which this equality determination should be made; and (3)
connect her constitutional commitments to both equality and liberty.
This Part considers each dimension of her thinking in turn.
First, Ginsburg does not regard an antisubordination approach as
an alternative to equality analysis. Rather, she regards
antisubordination as equality—that is, as equal standing and respect.
She insists that sex discrimination exists even when a regulation is
purportedly based on physical differences between the sexes, or
“when its impact concentrates on a portion of the protected class, for
69
example, married women, mothers, or pregnant women.” She so

68. VMI offers the governing statement of the intermediate scrutiny standard and explains
the intermediate scrutiny framework as vindicating antisubordination values. Writing for the
Court, Justice Ginsburg explains that “‘[i]nherent differences’ between men and women, we
have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members
of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” United States v.
Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). “Sex classifications,” she instructs, “may be used to
compensate women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’” id. (quoting
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam)), “to ‘promot[e] equal employment
opportunity,’” id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)),
and “to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people,” id. at
533–34. But, she underscores, “such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create
or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.” Id. at 534 (citing Goesaert
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)). Justice Ginsburg brings this same antisubordination
analytic to racial equality cases. Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The Constitution instructs all who act for the government that they may not ‘deny
to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.’ In implementing this equality instruction, as
I see it, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and
inclusion. Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly
ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its
aftereffects have been extirpated.” (citations omitted)).
The same antisubordination perspective guided Ginsburg’s argument in Struck, even
when she was seeking for her client the same treatment as nonpregnant service members who
were temporarily disabled or about to become a parent. The animating concern Ginsburg
expressed in Struck and subsequently on the bench was a concern with securing equal status,
and not a formalist concern with same treatment.
69. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 15.
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insists because her perspective deems constitutionally pertinent not
only the existence of a formal sex classification or intentional
discrimination but also the effects and social meanings of government
regulation of women. These concerns define an antisubordination
70
understanding of equality, which guides determination of when and
how equality values are implicated. As illustrated by Struck, such
guidance is critical in sex discrimination cases to negotiate when
differentiation implicates equality. In contrast to pregnancy
discrimination, Ginsburg likely did not devote her litigation efforts to
opposing, for example, sex-segregated bathrooms because they do not
implicate basic questions about the equal citizenship stature of
71
women.
Second, Ginsburg’s Struck brief makes plain that she determines
whether equality values are implicated primarily from the standpoint
of members of historically excluded groups, and not principally from
the perspective of members of included groups—which was the
72
approach taken by, among others, the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson
73
and Bradwell v. Illinois. According to the district court in Struck,
70. For a classic focus on the purposes, effects, and social meanings of a practice as
determinative under equal protection analysis, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). Professor Black wrote: “Can a system which, in
all that can be measured, has practiced the grossest inequality, actually have been ‘equal’ in
intent, in total social meaning and impact? ‘Thy speech maketh thee manifest . . .’; segregation,
in all visible things, speaks only haltingly any dialect but that of inequality.” Id. at 426.
71. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Fear of the Equal Rights Amendment, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 1975, at A21 (“Separate places to disrobe, sleep, perform personal bodily
functions are permitted, in some situations required, by regard for individual privacy.”); cf.
VMI, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19 (“Admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations
necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements, and
to adjust aspects of the physical training programs. Experience shows such adjustments are
manageable.” (citations omitted)).
72. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying
fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of
the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.”), with Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union, Address at the National Constitution
Center (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/hisownwords
(“[T]he path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African-American
community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination—
and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past—are real and must be
addressed.”).
73. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). The Court upheld the exclusion of
women from the practice of law. Id. at 139. In a concurring opinion, Justice Bradley wrote that
“[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother. This is the law of the Creator.” Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). “Although the
method of communication between the Creator and the jurist is never disclosed,” Ginsburg
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“[s]omebody said that [women are a little more difficult when they
are pregnant than when they are not], that there is some change in
their personality, and their capabilities. It could well be that the Air
74
Force felt that when they formulated their policy and rules . . . .” By
stark contrast, Ginsburg noted the many female doctors and nurses in
obstetrics and other medical fields who work right up to the day of
75
delivery, and she continually framed the case for the Court from
Captain Struck’s point of view. To reiterate, she drew from the
“petitioner’s experience” to substantiate her assertion that “many
women are capable of working effectively during pregnancy and
require only a brief period of absence immediately before and after
76
childbirth.” She underscored the devastating impact of the Air Force
regulation on the career prospects of a military woman and the lack
of any justification for the regulation that did not sound most
plausibly in traditional stereotypes about how women are “supposed”
77
to respond to a pregnancy.

wrote in her Struck brief, “‘divine ordinance’ has been a dominant theme in decisions justifying
laws establishing sex-based classifications.” Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 39.
74. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35 n.29 (alteration in original) (quoting
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Struck v. Sec’y of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (1971) (No. 711150) (statement of William N. Goodwin, J.)).
75. Id. at 35 & n.29.
76. Id. at 35.
77. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg viewed a recent sex discrimination case from the
perspective of the victim:
The Court’s insistence on immediate contest overlooks common characteristics of pay
discrimination. Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small
increments; cause to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time.
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from the employee’s view.
Employers may keep under wraps the pay differentials maintained among
supervisors, no less the reasons for those differentials. Small initial discrepancies may
not be seen as meet for a federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to
succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to making waves.
Pay disparities are thus significantly different from adverse actions “such as
termination, failure to promote . . . or refusal to hire,” all involving fully
communicated discrete acts, “easy to identify” as discriminatory. It is only when the
disparity becomes apparent and sizable, e.g., through future raises calculated as a
percentage of current salaries, that an employee in Ledbetter’s situation is likely to
comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial readiness to give her
employer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her from later challenging the
then current and continuing payment of a wage depressed on account of her sex.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Congress subsequently endorsed the perspective that Ginsburg
adopted in dissent. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was the first bill that President
Obama signed into law. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.
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Third, although Ginsburg stressed the equality dimension of
78
discharge-for-pregnancy regulations in her Struck brief, she also
asserted a substantive due process claim and advanced it in a way that
reveals the link between her views on constitutional equality and
79
constitutional liberty. (At the time of Roe, feminists understood
Struck as both an equality and a liberty case—just as they understood
80
Roe. ) In making the due process argument, Ginsburg continued to
81
speak in part in terms of “discrimination” and social subordination.
This is not because she was conceptually confused, but because she
registered that laws intervening in major life decisions and enforcing
status roles may simultaneously implicate both equality and liberty—
equal protection and due process. Restricting women’s liberty may be
a means to the end of communicating inequality, and discriminating
against women may diminish their opportunities to fashion fulfilling
82
lives. For Ginsburg, it seems less important to disentangle these two
clusters of constitutional commitments than it is to emphasize the
83
ways in which they are intertwined.
78. See Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 1, at 206 (“The main emphasis was on her equality
as a woman, vis-a-vis a man who was equally responsible for the conception . . . .”); id. (“I did
think about it, first and foremost, as differential treatment of the woman, based on her sex.”).
79. See id. at 205 (“[I]t has never in my mind been an either/or choice, never one rather
than the other; it has been both.”); id. at 206 (“At no time did I regard it as an either/or, one
pocket or the other issue.”).
80. See Goodman et al., supra note 34, at 35 (discussing reproductive freedom as the right
to decide whether to have or not to have children without state interference, and describing
Struck as a case about “coercion”). For an account of the feminist reproductive rights claims of
the era, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007). “In these early
briefs, liberty talk and equality talk were entangled as emanations of different constitutional
clauses.” Id. at 823.
81. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 52 (“The discriminatory treatment
required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited notion that a woman who
becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home to await childbirth and
thereafter devote herself to child care. Imposition of this outmoded standard upon petitioner
unconstitutionally encroaches upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life.”
(footnote omitted)).
82. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1738–45, 1763–66 (2008) (developing this insight); id. at
1744–45 (“Concern that restrictions on women’s liberty can communicate meanings about
women’s social standing lies at the heart of the sex discrimination cases, especially those cases
invalidating laws that deny women autonomy to make decisions about their family roles.”).
83. Justice Ginsburg has recently reemphasized the close link between constitutional
equality and constitutional liberty in the area of reproductive rights. See, e.g., Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Her opinion in Gonzales v.
Carhart cites equal protection sex discrimination cases as support for the abortion right. See id.
at 1649.
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Some feminists, however, have criticized Justice Ginsburg for
advocating a sex-blind formal equality in sex discrimination cases;
they depict her as only and overly concerned with arbitrary sex-based
84
differentiation —in substantial part because she championed the
85
causes of male plaintiffs in certain such cases. Much of this criticism
occurred in an era of backlash, when an increasingly conservative
Court was employing a formalist conception of classification to make
equal protection law blind to problems of disparate impact and
86
hostile to affirmative action, in sex as well as race cases. In such an

84. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 17, at 216, 231 (“Fourteen of the [nineteen] cases decided
since Craig were brought by men. Lower court cases exhibit a similar pattern. The women’s
won-lost record is better than the men’s; moreover, victories by men do not necessarily harm
women and may benefit them. But so far men have been the primary beneficiaries of the new
sexual equality doctrine. Ruth Bader Ginsburg has given no indication that this outcome
troubles her. She continues to regard sex equality not as requiring the elimination of male
supremacy, but as a problem of discrimination, of basing decisions on a person’s sex.” (footnote
omitted)); David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s World,
2 L. & INEQUALITY 33, 55 (1984) (“Ginsburg chose to litigate issues that she could frame as
hurting both men and women, rather than issues, like pregnancy discrimination, where the harm
fell on women alone. She sought to deny women’s ‘difference;’ this strategy both limited her
range and increased her chances for success. Ginsburg’s classic argument was to insist that
women were like men. She sought to show that women were similarly situated, but that society
had treated them differently because of stereotypical ‘old notions’ and ‘archaic assumptions’
about sex roles. . . . Nevertheless, Ginsburg’s assimilationist method could not address the entire
range of women’s rights issues. Assimilation is most obviously an insufficient response to issues
of reproductive freedom. In this area, women are biologically different, and therefore women
must be treated differently to be treated equally.”). Ginsburg has herself summarized much of
the criticism. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist
Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 17 (“[Feminist legal scholars] have
portrayed the 1970s litigation as assimilationist in outlook, insistent on formal equality, opening
doors only to comfortably situated women willing to accept men’s rules and be treated like men,
even a misguided effort that harmed more women than it helped.”).
85. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional an Oklahoma
law that allowed women to buy 3.2 percent beer at age eighteen but did not allow men to buy
such beer until age twenty-one); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (declaring
unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that allowed a woman whose husband
died to receive benefits based on his earnings but did not allow a man whose wife died to
receive benefits based on her earnings); Moritz v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1972) (declaring unconstitutional a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that
denied a deduction for dependent-care expenses to a man who never married while granting the
deduction to women, widowers, divorcés, and husbands in certain circumstances). Wiesenfeld in
particular was “[a] case near and dear to my heart.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, quoted in AMY
LEIGH CAMPBELL, RAISING THE BAR: RUTH BADER GINSBURG AND THE ACLU WOMEN’S
RIGHTS PROJECT 93 (2004). This is perhaps because a man was ready, willing, and able to raise
his child in a society that deemed him perverse for wanting to do what had long been deemed
“women’s work.”
86. For an account of these developments in race discrimination law, see generally Fiss,
supra note 64; Siegel, supra note 64, at 1535–38. One of the authors has explored the
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era, it was possible to (mis)construe Ginsburg’s selection of male sex
discrimination plaintiffs as of a piece with the formalist reasoning of
the Burger Court.
As the Struck brief shows, however, it was not. Ginsburg’s
selection of a pregnant plaintiff to advance the equal protection
claims of women demonstrates that she was no formalist. In Struck
itself, Ginsburg explained that she was challenging laws that enforce
traditional sex-role stereotypes because such laws lead to the
subordination of women: “presumably well-meaning exaltation of
woman’s unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied women
equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities
and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in
87
society.” Captain Struck “was presumed unfit for service under a
regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits into the
stereotyped vision . . . of the ‘correct’ female response to
88
pregnancy.” Ginsburg’s message was clear: sex-role stereotypes of
the separate spheres tradition subordinate women by denying them
an equal chance to make their own meaning of their lives.
In an important forthcoming article, Cary Franklin has
reconstructed the social theory on which Ginsburg’s early litigation
89
strategy was premised. As Franklin shows, Ginsburg understood that
the stereotypes contested by the male plaintiffs she represented were
part of a dyadic system of gender roles that defined men as
breadwinners and women as dependent caregivers in ways that
90
subordinated women. Ginsburg’s antistereotyping approach was not

implications in sex discrimination law. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2188–95 (1996) (showing how the Court’s rejection
of disparate impact claims in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), shielded from equal protection scrutiny “facially
neutral” practices (such as domestic violence policies) that have long played a role in
subordinating women).
87. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 38; see also id. at 38–45 (discussing, inter alia,
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908); and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)).
88. Id. at 50–51 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2010) (manuscript on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
90. See id. at 3–4. Franklin explains that “Ginsburg derived the anti-stereotyping principle
in part from . . . the law and politics of Sweden, which began in the early 1960s to wage an
ambitious, decades-long campaign against sex-role enforcement.” Id. at 4. Specifically, the
Swedish anti-stereotyping ideals that would powerfully impact Professor Ginsburg went far
beyond insisting on formal equality between the sexes. “Proponents of jämställdhet,” as this
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simply hostile to sex classification or sex differentiation; she opposed
traditional sex stereotypes insofar as they were part of a system of
social roles and understandings that anchored women’s inequality.
Ginsburg’s effort to defend a pregnant member of the Air Force
is of a piece with her interest in bringing cases on behalf of caregiving
men. Neither reflects a formal view of equality. Instead, Ginsburg
challenged laws enforcing traditional sex stereotypes because she
understood them as part of a larger set of social arrangements that
ultimately subordinated women.
Ginsburg’s articulation of an antisubordination perspective in
Struck is even more remarkable when the brief is situated in historical
context. Today, antisubordination arguments tend to be associated
with Owen Fiss’s 1976 expression of antisubordination themes in
91
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause
and Catherine
MacKinnon’s 1979 use of an antisubordination analytic in Sexual
92
Harassment of Working Women. The Struck brief evidences
Ginsburg speaking in an antisubordination register in 1972, carrying
into the sex equality context concerns about status inequality
93
expressed in debates over Brown v. Board of Education. One cannot
help but be struck (so to speak) by the timing of this brief. Although
Ginsburg was by no means the only legal feminist at the time to
conceive sex equality from an antisubordination perspective, she did
play an early and leading role in showing how concerns about social
Swedish theory of gender equality was known, “believed sex classifications were often necessary
in order to break down traditional conceptions of men and women’s roles; their aim was not to
eliminate formal sex classifications but to liberate both sexes from prescriptive sex stereotypes.”
Id. at 17. According to Franklin, it was for this reason, and not because of strategic
considerations or a commitment to formal equality, that Professor Ginsburg sought out male
plaintiffs in several of the cases that she litigated. For citations to some of these cases, see supra
note 85.
91. Fiss, supra note 64, at 157 (proposing to substitute for the equal treatment principle a
group-disadvantaging principle premised on a theory of “status-harm” that would inquire
whether a challenged practice would “impair or threaten or aggravate the status or position of
the group”).
92. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979) (proposing that courts determining whether a practice
discriminates on the basis of sex inquire “whether the policy or practice in question integrally
contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or deprived position because of gender status”);
see also supra note 64 (citing scholarship on antisubordination).
93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For discussions of debates about the
meaning of Brown, see Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 231–37 (2008); Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans:
Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 830–33, 841–43
(2006); Siegel, supra note 64, at 1532–44.
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subordination illuminate the problem of sex discrimination. Her
prescience has not been sufficiently recognized.
The timing of Ginsburg’s Struck brief is noteworthy for another
reason. Ginsburg persuasively urged the Court to view pregnancy
discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, and sex discrimination
as inextricably intertwined with women’s autonomy to decide
whether to bear children, at a time when the entire landscape of
modern sex discrimination law and substantive due process law had
yet to be worked out. Ginsburg and the women’s movement talked
about pregnancy discrimination in a way that ties together pregnancy
discrimination and women’s equality, and women’s equality and
94
reproductive freedom, before the Court split them apart in cases
such as Roe v. Wade, Frontiero v. Richardson, and Geduldig v. Aiello.
The Court made some fateful choices in those cases: to focus its sex
equality jurisprudence on cases other than pregnancy, and so to
develop its sex equality jurisprudence in isolation from its abortion
95
jurisprudence. It is only by apprehending where the law was and
where it was about to go when Struck was litigated that one can fully
appreciate the momentousness, the audacity, and the profundity of
this brief—as well as the implications of its erasure. In 1976, the Court
embraced the intermediate scrutiny standard for sex discrimination
claims in a case involving men who sought to purchase 3.2 percent
96
beer. How would our understanding of sex discrimination and
substantive due process law differ had the Court recognized the equal
protection claim of a pregnant service woman who challenged the
government’s requirement that she have an abortion or lose her
position in the military?
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE
This Essay has not come close to recovering all of the virtues of
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s merits brief in Struck v. Secretary of Defense.
Nor has it identified all of the interesting questions and ironies that it

94. See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL, ON THE ROAD TO ROE V. WADE: HOW
AMERICANS TALKED ABOUT ABORTION IN THE YEARS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S
LANDMARK RULING (forthcoming 2010) (reproducing feminist arguments for abortion rights
from 1969–73 that invoke both privacy and equality and analyze the regulation of abortion as
part of the regulation of motherhood).
95. For a discussion of these two points, see infra Part IV.
96. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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implicates. The brief is a veritable treasure trove of accurate
predictions, subtle insights, and effective advocacy. Among other
things, it mentions the possibility of intermediate scrutiny for sex
98
classifications, leaves the door open for “compensatory treatment”
99
of women “in special situations,” underscores the men who have
100
adopted Ginsburg’s position, gently gestures in the direction of the
link between sex discrimination and burdensome regulations of
101
102
abortion, and emphasizes themes of sexual intimacy and privacy,
which decades later would find expression in the Court’s dawning
103
recognition of the equal citizenship stature of homosexuals.
Throughout the brief, Ginsburg’s distinct and powerful voice is
present. For legal academics who care about the development of
Justice Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination, the brief is essential
reading.
Most significantly, however, the brief deserves a wide readership
because of what it instructs about the present. It may soon be time to
reimagine what is possible in this corner of constitutional law. In
1972, Professor Ginsburg made a compelling argument that
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination because of the social
understandings about women it reflects and the profound limitations
on their lives it enforces. Although the Court eventually accepted

97. Particularly in light of how cultural battle lines have been drawn in the twenty-first
century, it is illuminating to see Justice Ginsburg’s voice deployed in the service of both the
equal citizenship stature of women and one particular woman’s religiously based opposition to
procuring an abortion. From the vantage point of the present, it may be ironic that Ginsburg’s
views on sex discrimination and abortion first developed in this setting. But it serves as an
instructive reminder that Americans today agree about more than they often realize.
98. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 26 (“In addition to the two commonly
differentiated review standards, some of the decisions of this Court suggest an intermediate
standard.”).
99. Id. at 29 n.24 (“It is not urged here that extensive compensatory treatment is needed to
redress past discrimination against women. [A Second Circuit decision], however, indicates that
in special situations compensatory treatment may be appropriate.” (referencing Gruenwald v.
Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968)).
100. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“In 1971, two legal scholars—both of them male—examined the
record of the judiciary in sex discrimination cases; they concluded that the performance of
American judges in this area ‘can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to
abominable.’”).
101. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 54 n.55 (“Griswold alone, or in conjunction
with Baird, has been cited in numerous lower court decisions holding that women have a right
to determine for themselves, free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, whether or not to
bear children.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970))).
102. See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text.
103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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much of her general vision of sex equality, it was slow to recognize
discrimination against pregnant women as a paradigmatic form of sex
discrimination. In 1974, the Court in Geduldig acknowledged that
discrimination against pregnant women might be animated by
invidious judgments about women, but found exclusion of pregnancy
benefits from otherwise comprehensive disability insurance to be a
104
rational method of saving taxpayer monies.
The Court did,
however, yield to the instruction of Congress that discrimination
against pregnant women can violate federal employment
discrimination law, and began to enforce the Pregnancy
Discrimination Amendment (PDA) (1978) to Title VII of the 1964
105
Civil Rights Act. After three decades of PDA litigation, Americans
are more receptive to the claim that discrimination against pregnant
women is sex discrimination, and they have come to view it as a claim
106
of fundamental—even constitutional—magnitude.
With these

104. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974). The Gedulgig decision reasoned:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those
considered in [Reed and Frontiero]. Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to
include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any
reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
Id. at 496 n.20 (emphasis added). This much quoted passage from Geduldig is often read as
denying that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. In fact, the passage in question
reasons that pregnancy discrimination is not always sex discriminatory or invidious, but
sometimes may be. As shown in this Part, in the years since its decision in Geduldig, the Court
has come to recognize that gender bias in the regulation of pregnancy is more prevalent than
perhaps it first believed.
105. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2042 n.309
(2003).
106. Consider, for example, the likely political prospects of an attempt to repeal the PDA,
which responded to Geduldig and Gilbert. Gilbert followed Geduldig’s reasoning and held that a
disability benefit plan excluding disabilities related to pregnancy was not sex-based
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). For a discussion of the PDA’s role in shaping popular and
judicial understandings of sex discrimination, see Reva B. Siegel, “You’ve Come a Long Way,
Baby”: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1871, 1897–98 (2006).
The Court recently discussed this case law and Congress’s responses to it in AT&T
Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009). There, the Court held that an employer does not
necessarily violate the PDA when it pays pension benefits based in part on an accrual rule,
applied only prior to the PDA’s enactment, that gave less retirement credit for pregnancy leave
than for medical leave generally. Id. at 1966. Only Justice Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg’s
passionate dissent, in which she described Gilbert as wrong—indeed, “astonishing,”
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changes, the Court has begun to move closer to Ginsburg’s
understanding of sex discrimination without wholeheartedly
107
embracing her point of view.
For example, it was Chief Justice Rehnquist—Rehnquist!—who
wrote the majority opinion in Nevada Department of Human
108
Resources v. Hibbs. Hibbs upheld the leave provision of the Family
109
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) as a valid exercise of
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
110
combat unconstitutional sex discrimination. Remarkably, the Hibbs
Court expressly registered the sometimes deep divide between formal
equality and substantive equality: in an America in which women are
still required to serve as the principal caregivers in their families,

“egregious[],” and “aberrational”—the day it was decided. Id. at 1977, 1979 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). All of the other Justices allowed AT&T to perpetuate pay differentials in the postPDA period that were attributable to pregnancy discrimination that occurred in the pre-PDA
period.
But if seven Justices allowed AT&T to perpetuate pay differentials attributable to prePDA discrimination, none of them said anything in defense of Geduldig and Gilbert’s reasoning.
In essence, the majority reasoned that the employer’s discrimination was reasonable when it
occurred, even if it was no longer an acceptable way to treat women. Ginsburg’s
characterization of Gilbert provoked no defense of the decision from any other Justice. This is in
stark contrast to what commonly occurs when individual Justices speak their minds forcefully in
controversial areas of law. (Consider, for instance, Justice Scalia’s response to Justice Stevens
regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).)
Both the narrow holding and the loud silences in Hulteen suggest little enthusiasm on the early
Roberts Court for defending the view of the relation between pregnancy discrimination and sex
discrimination espoused in Geduldig and Gilbert.
107. For a discussion of these developments from the perspective of legal doctrine, see Neil
S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping, from Struck to Carhart, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming November 2009) (symposium essay honoring the jurisprudence of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
108. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). Commentators have noted
the magnitude of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s shift in position from his early days on the Court to
VMI, see United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 558–66 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment), and then to Hibbs. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Introduction:
Learning to Listen to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. CITY L. REV. 213, 218–19 (2004); Deborah
Jones Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of Opportunity and
Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 47 (2004); Siegel, supra note 106, at 1871–98. The evolution of
the late Chief Justice’s views on sex discrimination is as striking as the development of his
relationship with Justice Ginsburg is endearing. During the year one of the authors spent in her
chambers, she often expressed her devotion to him by calling him “the Chief” or “my Chief.”
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of
Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 267–
70 (1997) (discussing, inter alia, the change in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s views on sex
discrimination and referring to him as “my now Chief”).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2006).
110. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 740.
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mere formal equality in the administration of family leave benefits—
for example, allowing no leave time for any employees—would
111
“exclude far more women than men from the workplace” and
therefore would not effectively “combat the stereotypes about the
roles of male and female employees that Congress sought to
112
eliminate” in passing the FMLA.
Hibbs reflects the understanding that new mothers and pregnant
women face intense stereotyping in the workplace. Hibbs observes
that “denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has
[long] been traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that
113
women are mothers first, and workers second.” “This prevailing
ideology about women’s roles,” the Court agreed with Congress, has
“justified discrimination against women when they are mothers or
114
mothers-to-be.” In these and other passages, Hibbs clearly indicates
that regulation of pregnant women can amount to constitutionally
actionable sex discrimination; for example, the Court suggests that
laws giving benefits to pregnant employees that are premised on
115
traditional sex-role stereotypes violate equal protection. The Hibbs
Court had no occasion to reconcile the opinion’s reasoning with
116
Geduldig, but the reasoning in Hibbs parallels Ginsburg’s reasoning
117
in Struck, not the Burger Court’s reasoning in Geduldig. Although
Geduldig is commonly read as holding that discrimination against
pregnant women can never be sex discrimination, after Hibbs it is
time to read Geduldig more precisely, as holding that discrimination

111. Id. at 738.
112. Id. at 734. The implications of such reasoning for the scope of congressional power
under Section 5 are broad indeed. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 89, at 47–50 (persuasively
defending the constitutionality of legislation (1) expanding the FMLA’s coverage to small and
midsize employers and to provide covered employees with paid leave; (2) requiring paid sick
leave; (3) providing affordable childcare; and (4) addressing sex segregation in the American
labor market).
113. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: J. Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the
H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1986) (statement of Women’s Legal
Defense Fund)).
114. Id. (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, supra note 113, at 100).
115. See id. at 731 & n.5.
116. For further discussion of Geduldig, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
117. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). For a discussion of the Court’s
reasoning in Hibbs, see generally Siegel, supra note 106, at 1889–91.
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against pregnant woman is not always sex discrimination—but
118
sometimes can be.
In addition to arguing that pregnancy discrimination is sex
discrimination, Ginsburg also intimated on behalf of Captain Struck
in 1972 that women’s equality and women’s reproductive freedom are
inextricably linked. She noted the many lower courts, including the
federal district court in Roe, that had read the Court’s contraception
decisions as “holding that women have a right to determine for
themselves, free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, whether
119
or not to bear children.” Although Roe incompletely grasped this
link and discussed the abortion right from the perspective of a
120
woman’s physician,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
121
Pennsylvania v. Casey came closer to registering the true stakes.
The plurality opinion in Casey stressed the liberty of the pregnant

118. For further elaboration of this reading of Geduldig, see generally Siegel & Siegel, supra
note 107. Because the PDA is firmly entrenched, it may be unclear what would be the practical
implications in the pregnancy context of recognizing pregnancy discrimination as
unconstitutional sex discrimination. There might be some practical consequences in light of
potential Eleventh Amendment objections to enforcing the PDA in certain settings. Yet a Court
that takes Hibbs seriously would be unlikely to impose any Section 5 impediment to enforcing
the PDA against the states. And a Court that does not take Hibbs seriously would be unlikely to
recognize pregnancy discrimination as unconstitutional sex discrimination. Regardless, broader
doctrinal implications would follow from recognizing that physical differences between the
sexes are the beginning, not the end, of the constitutional conversation about women’s equality.
For example, Cary Franklin suggests that, after VMI and Hibbs, it no longer seems open to the
federal government to assert that physical differences between the sexes justify excluding
women from selective service registration, eligibility for the draft, and various combat positions.
See Franklin, supra note 89, at 51–53. Nor, she argues, does it seem permissible for the
government to support programs of single-sex education that reinforce traditional sex-role
stereotypes. See id. at 46–47. Nor, she astutely notes, are certain rationales for prohibiting gay
marriage reconcilable with an anti-stereotyping conception of constitutional equality. See id. at
57–65.
119. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 54 n.55; see also text accompanying note 101.
For subsequent discussions, see generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the
Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this
‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State.”); id. at 164 (“For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”).
121. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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122

woman, and a majority of Justices began to articulate the sex
123
equality implications of intrusive restrictions on abortion. To be
124
sure, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart may have taken a step in a
125
very different direction.
But four Justices adopted Justice
Ginsburg’s apprehension that “legal challenges to undue restrictions
on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized
notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
126
stature.” Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion makes
conceptual sense only if one presupposes the continued existence of
127
the abortion right, and Kennedy has long recognized the link
122. Id. at 876 (plurality opinion) (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the
appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally
protected liberty.”).
123. See, e.g., id. at 852 (“Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been
in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”); id. at 856
(“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”); id. at 897 (stating that the
views expressed in Bradwell and Hoyt “of course, are no longer consistent with our
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution”).
124. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
125. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959,
1014–30 (2008).
126. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (citing Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992), and Sylvia Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1002–28 (1984)); see also, e.g.,
Siegel, supra note 80, at 837–38 (situating Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Carhart in a survey of
sex equality arguments for reproductive rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, Ginsburg’s Dissent
May Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A31 (noting that in Carhart, Justice Ginsburg
“attempted to re-conceive the foundations of the abortion right, basing it on well-established
constitutional principles of equality”).
127. Carhart exemplifies the often real but notoriously blurry distinction between
constitutional politics and constitutional law. On the one hand, opponents of abortion have used
the issue of so-called partial-birth abortion to undermine the abortion right in general, see
Siegel, supra note 82, at 1707–09, and the Carhart Court effectively overruled precedent in order
to uphold a federal ban on the procedure, see Siegel, supra note 125, at 1020–21. On the other
hand, the Court reasoned that the ban could survive a facial challenge because the procedure
was sufficiently distinct from abortion in general and did not impose an undue burden on the
right to abortion. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1627. For one attempt to understand the ragged
relationship between constitutional politics and constitutional law, see generally Robert C. Post
& Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action,
and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473 (2007). One of the authors has
explored this relationship in more depth. See generally Siegel, supra note 125 (conceiving law as
an institution that must account for the conditions of its own legitimation); Neil S. Siegel,
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007) (identifying
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between human dignity as equality and human dignity as liberty,
128
including in the context of abortion.
In short, the future has yet to be determined. For reasons
intellectual, historical, and jurisprudential, Professor Ginsburg’s
skillful advocacy on behalf of Captain Susan Struck warrants the
careful inspection that it has long been denied. The Struck brief shows
that in 1972 Ruth Bader Ginsburg viewed laws imposing traditional
sex stereotypical roles on pregnant women as a core case of sex
discrimination; she argued that such laws violated equal protection
because they denied individual women equal opportunity and
imposed on women as a group a dependent, subordinate status in
American society. Haltingly but discernibly, the country is coming to
adopt her perspective as its own.

ways in which judges, especially Justices, act not as “umpires” but as engaged participants in the
constitutional culture of the nation).
128. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy’s relevant views, see generally Siegel, supra note
82.

